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Abstract
In this paper, we introduce a non-linear Lanchester’s model of NCW-type and investigate an optimization problem for
this model, where only the Red force is supplied by several supply agents. Optimal fire allocation of the Blue force is
sought in the form of a piece-wise constant function of time. A ”threatening rate” is computed for the Red force and
each of its supply agents at the beginning of each stage of the combat. These rates can be used to derive the optimal
decision for the Blue force to focus its firepower to the Red force itself or one of its supply agents. This optimal fire
allocation is derived and proved by considering an optimization problem of number of Blue force’s troops. Numerical
experiments are included to demonstrate the theoretical results.
Keywords
Non-linear Lanchester’s model, Network Centric Warfare, optimal fire allocation, optimization problem, piece-wise
constant function, optimal strategy.
Introduction
In 1916, Lanchester (1) introduced a mathematical model
for a battle in the form of a system of differential equations
two unknowns of which are the number of the two involved
parties. In 1962, Deitchman (2) extended Lanchester’s
model by investigating battle between an army and a guerilla
force. This model is called a guerilla warfare model or an
asymetric model. In this model, the fire of guerilla force is
supposed to be aimed while of the army is unaimed. Later,
Schaffer (3) and Schreiber (4) generalized Deitchman’s
model further by taking into account the intelligence and
considered the problem of optimizing the fire allocation of
the army.
Recently, Kaplan, Kress and Szechtman (KKS) (5), (6)
also considered Lanchester model with intelligence in a
scenario of counter-terrorism. In this asymmetric model,
intelligence play a decisive role in the outcome of the
combat. In addition, a lot of researchers are interested in
optimization problems involving warfare models. In 1974,
Taylor (7) studied several problems of optimizing the fire
allocation for some warfare models. Lin and Mackay (8)
extended Taylor’s results on optimization of fire allocation
for Lanchester’s model of the form one against many. A
common interest of these two studies is optimizing the
number of troops. Feichtinger and his colleagues (9) studied
an optimization problem for KKS model with objective
function being the cost of the battle, intelligence and
reinforcement being control variables. Then, the authors
investigated a modified asymmetric Lanchester (n, 1) model
describing a combat between a group of n counter-terrorism
forces and a single group of terrorists, (10). In these works
above, the role of military supply has not been studied
thoroughly.
The idea of Network Centric Warfare has recently drawn
a lot of attention of researchers all over the world. Network
Centric Warfare (NCW) emphasizes the role of information
and information sharing between entities involved. The idea
is originated in 1995 when Admiral William A. Owens
introduced the notion ”system of systems” in a paper
published by INSS, (11). In this work, Owens described the
stochastic evolution of a system of reconnaissance, command
and control system, together with high-precision weapons,
allowing to share battlefield awareness, to estimate the target
and to allocate resources. NCW is an approach to the conduct
of warfare that derives its power from the effective linking or
networking of the warfighting enterprise. It is characterized
by the ability of geographically dispersed forces (consisting
of entities) to create a high level of shared battlespace
awareness that can be exploited via self-synchronization and
other network-centric operations to achieve commanders’
intents (12). For a more thorough exposition of NCW, we
refer the readers to (13), (14), (15).
By historical facts, it is undeniable that supply forces also
play a vital role in the outcome of the battle. On the other
hand, the optimal decision making problem in military field
is interesting itself and fire allocating problem is one of the
most common problems. In this regard, Donghyun Kim (16)
set up and investigated a non-linear Lanchester-type model
where one of the parties is supported by a network consisting
of all kinds of supply such as intelligence, ammunition,
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Figure 1. Diagram for the model
(
B vs (R,A1, A2)
)
.
medical, etc. However, there are various types of supply an
army should be provided during a combat. Each of them
plays a different role in the combat and their affects are
different, too. Nevertheless, all these kinds of supply to a
party can be eliminated by the firepower of the other one for
the sake of victory.
In this work, exploiting the idea of NCW and bearing
in mind the role of military logistics, we set up a model
where a Blue force B is fighting against a Red force
R supported by n supply agents Ai (i = 1, . . . , n). These
supply agents have different affects on the attrition rate of
R. By assuming that the affects are all described by linear
functions and investigating the resulting model, we manage
to derive an optimized strategy for the Blue force B to keep
its status at its best. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Next section is devoted to present model setting
and to investigate the optimization problem for this model.
Numerical experiments are presented in the last section to
illustrate the main results.
Main Results
The Model
Let us consider a combat between a Blue force and a
Red force and assume that the Red force is supplied by n
different supply agents. We use the following notations:
• B: Blue force
• R: Red force (Attack)
• Ai (i = 1, ..., n): Red force’s supply agents
• rR: an attrition rate of B to R
• ri: an attrition rate of B to A
i
• f iα(A
i): an attrition function of Ai complementing R
to B.
• P = (p0, p1, ..., pn): the fire allocating proportion of
B to R and Ai : i = 1, . . . , n, respectively.
• αA
i
c : the fully connected attrition rate of R with A
i
• αA
i
d : the fully disconnected attrition rate ofR with A
i
(αA
i
d ≤ α
Ai
c ).
For the sake of simplicity, we study a model where B
are fighting against R and R have two supply agents A1
and A2 with two complementing fire attrition functions
f1α
(
A1
)
, f2α
(
A2
)
, respectively. We denote this model
as
(
B vs (R,A1, A2)
)
. The diagram for this model is
presented in Figure 1. Let us consider the problem of finding
the optimal fire allocation of B such that at any time t, the
remaining troops ofB is maximized.We seek for the optimal
fire allocating proportion of B in the form of a piece-wise
constant function. This choice is realistic since it is absurd to
alter the fire allocation constantly, especially during a certain
stage of the battle. For this purpose, we assume that P =
(p0, p1, p2) where pi : i = 0, 1, 2 are piece-wise constant
functions such that p0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] : p0 + p1 + p2 = 1.
The complementing attrition functions are assumed to be
linear ones of the form:
f iα(A
i) = αA
i
d + (α
Ai
c − α
Ai
d )
Ai
Ai0
(i = 1, 2).
where Ai0 number of A
i’s troops at the beginning. Let us
observe that, at the beginning, when Ai = Ai0, R and A
i has
a full connection and f iα(A
i) attains its maximal value αA
i
c .
When Ai is totally eliminated by B, Ai = 0, the connection
between R and Ai is terminated and f iα(A
i) becomes αA
i
d .
The numbers of troops of all the parties involved in the
battle are governed by the following system of differential
equations: 

dB
dt
= −
(
f1α(A
1) + f2α(A
2)
)
R
dR
dt
= −p0rRB
dA1
dt
= −p1r1B
dA2
dt
= −p2r2B.
(1)
It is apparent that supply agents A1, A2 create their impacts
on the outcome of the battle by influencing the attrition rate
of R to B. When their number of troops is eliminated, their
impacts are stopped accordingly.
Optimal fire allocation of Blue force
For the model (1), we consider the problem of maximizing
the Blue force’s number of troops at any time. Let us
compute the following:
b0 = (α
A1
c + α
A2
c )rR,
b1 =
r1(α
A1
c − α
A1
d )R0
A10
,
b2 =
r2(α
A2
c − α
A2
d )R0
A20
.
(2)
These numbers represent the ”threatening rates” which the
Red force and its supply agents expose to the Blue force. The
optimal fire allocation of B is pointed out in the following
theorem.
Theorem 1. If p0, p1, p2 are piece-wise constant functions
and p0, p1, p2 ∈ [0, 1] : p0 + p1 + p2 = 1 then the optimal
fire allocation of B is
P ∗ =


(1, 0, 0) if b0 ≥ b1 and b0 ≥ b2,
(0, 1, 0) if b1 ≥ b2 and b1 ≥ b0,
(0, 0, 1) if b2 ≥ b1 and b2 ≥ b0.
(3)
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3Proof. LetX(t) =
∫ t
0 B(s)ds. It follows thatX
′(t) = B(t)
and
X ′′(t) = B′(t)
= −
(
fα(A
1) + gα(A
2)
)
R.
(4)
We also have∫ t
0
dR = −
∫ t
0
rRB(s)ds⇒ R(t)−R(0) = −p0rRX(t).
This leads to
R(t) = −p0rRX(t) +R0. (5)
By similar arguments, we get
A1(t) = −p1r1X(t) +A
1
0, (6)
A2(t) = −p2r2X(t) +A
2
0. (7)
Substituting (5), (6) and (7) into (4) we obtain
X ′′(t) = −C1X
2(t) + C2X(t)− C3 (8)
where
C1 =
p0p1rRr1(α
A1
c − α
A1
d )
A10
+
p0p2rRr2(α
A2
c − α
A2
d )
A20
,
C2 =
p1r1(α
A1
c − α
A1
d )R0 + p0rRα
A1
c A
1
0
A10
+
p2r2(α
A2
c − α
A2
d )R0 + p0rRα
A2
c A
2
0
A20
,
C3 =(α
A1
c + α
A2
c )R0.
Multiplying both sides of (8) by dX ′(t) and integrating, one
gets
X ′(t) = B(t)
=
√
−
2
3
C1X3(t) + C2X2(t)− 2C3X(t) + C4,
where C4 is an integral constant. Since C3 is not changing
in time and C1, C2 are non-negative, in order to maximize
B(t), we will seek for conditions for which C1 is minimal
and C2 is maximal simultaneously. Thus, we consider the
multi-objective optimization problem

min
P∈P
C1
max
P∈P
C2,
(9)
whereP = {(p0, p1, p2) : 0 ≤ p0, p1, p2 ≤ 1, p0 + p1 + p2 = 1}.
Let us denote
a1 =
rRrA1(α
A1
c − α
A1)
c
A10
, a2 =
rRrA2(α
A2
c − α
A2
c )
A20
.
The problem (9) now takes the form{
min(a1xy + a2xz)
min(−b0x− b1y − b2z),
s.t.
{
0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1
x+ y + z = 1.
(10)
In order to solve the problem (10), we use the scalarization
method. Thus, for each γ ∈ [0.1] we define the function
Fγ(x, y, z) = γ(a1xy + a2xz)− (1− γ)(b0x+ b1y + b2z)
and consider the following problem
minFγ(x, y, z)
s.t.
{
0 ≤ x, y, z ≤ 1
x+ y + z = 1.
(11)
By substituting x = 1− y − z into (11) we obtain the
following problem:
minFγ(1 − y − z, y, z)
s.t
{
0 ≤ y, z ≤ 1
y + z ≤ 1,
(12)
where
Fγ (1− y − z, y, z) = γ (1− y − z) (a1y + a2z)−
(1− γ) (b0 + (b1 − b0) y + (b2 − b0) z) .
We consider the following distinct cases:
1. b1 ≥ b2 ≥ b0. Since γ(1− y − z)(a1y + a2z) ≥ 0,
one gets
minFγ ≥− (1− γ)(b0 + (b1 − b0)y + (b2 − b0)z)
≥− (1− γ)(b0 + (b1 − b0)(y + z))
≥− (1− γ)b1 = Fγ(0, 1, 0).
2. b1 ≥ b0 ≥ b2. The problem becomes
min{γ(1− y − z)(a1y + a2z)
+ (1− γ)(b0 − b2)z
− (1 − γ)(b0 + (b1 − b0)y)}.
It easily follows that
minFγ ≥ −(1− γ)b1 = Fγ(0, 1, 0).
3. b2 ≥ b1 ≥ b0. Simple calculations yield that
minFγ ≥− (1− γ)(b0 + (b2 − b0)(y + z))
≥− (1− γ)b2 = Fγ(0, 0, 1).
4. b2 ≥ b0 ≥ b1. The problem becomes
min{γ(1− y − z)(a1y + a2z)
+ (1− γ)(b0 − b1)y
− (1− γ)(b0 + (b2 − b0)z)}.
It leads to
minFγ ≥ −(1− γ)b2 = Fγ(0, 0, 1).
5. b0 ≥ b1, b0 ≥ b2. The problem now turns out to be
min{γ(1− y − z)(a1y + a2z)
+ (1− γ)((b0 − b1)y + (b0 − b2)z)
− (1− γ)b0}.
Prepared using sagej.cls
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Figure 2. Five cases and their corresponding processes in
Theorem 1.
One obtains, in this case, that
minFγ ≥ −(1− γ)b0 = Fγ(1, 0, 0).
The proof is now complete.
Basically, the battle has three stages. In the first stage, the
Blue force focuses its firepower to one of the three entities
of the Red party: R,A1, A2. Once the targeted entity is
eliminated, in the second stage, the Blue force concentrates
its troops to fight one of the two remaining entities. In the last
stage, the Blue force focuses its power to the last remaining
entity. However, the battle may not necessarily have all three
stages, once the Red force is eliminated after some stage
the battle comes to an end since the Blue force is no longer
attrited. In our proof for Theorem 1, by comparing the three
”threatening rates”, we establish the optimal fire allocation of
Blue force for the first stage. If Red force remains untouched
after the first stage, there is only one supply agent remaining,
we may apply Kim’s results (16). In case 1 of our five
cases, in order to make the remaining troops of Blue force
maximal, it should strategically focus all its firepower to A1.
When A1 is excluded, the ”threatening rates” are now b0 =(
αA
2
c + α
A1
d
)
rR, b2 =
r2(α
A
2
c
−αA
2
d
)R0
A2
0
. By Kim’s results,
if b0 < b2, Blue force should concentrate its troops to fight
A2. OnceA2 is out of the picture, there comes the third stage
where Blue force fights the Red force with no supply agents.
Otherwise, b0 > b2, second stage of the battle commences
with Blue force focusing its power to fight Red force and the
battle will come to an end after this stage. For the remaining
four cases, the strategy of Blue force is analyzed similarly.
A1 f
1
α A
2 f2α
R
fnα A
n
B
p
1r
1
pn
rn
p0rR
Figure 3. The generalized model
(
B vs (R,A1, A2, . . . , An)
)
.
All five cases of the battle and their corresponding processes
are described in the graph of Figure 2.
Now, we generalize this model where the Red force
supplied by n supply agents fights the Blue force with an
attrition rate f1α(A
1) + f2α(A
2) + · · ·+ fnα (A
n). We denote
the generalized model as
(
B vs (R,A1, A2, . . . , An)
)
. Let
us assume, as before, that
f iα(A
i) = αA
i
d + (α
Ai
c − α
Ai
d )
Ai
Ai0
, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. (13)
The model is described by the following system of
differential equations:

dB
dt
= −
n∑
i=1
[
αA
i
d +
(
αA
i
c − α
Ai
d
)
Ai
Ai
0
]
R
dR
dt
= −p0rRB
dAi
dt
= −piriB (i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
(14)
Let
ai =
rRri(α
Ai
c − α
Ai
d )
Ai0
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n) (15)
and
b0 =
(
αA
1
c + ...+ α
An
c
)
rR,
bi =
ri
(
αA
i
c − α
Ai
d
)
R0
A10
(i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
(16)
For the generalized model, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the optimal fire allocation
P ∗ is sought in the set P = {P = (p0, p1, p2, . . . , pn) :
pi is piece-wise constant function , pi ∈ [0, 1] ∀i;
n∑
i=0
pi =
1}. Then the optimal fire allocation of B is
P ∗ =

0, ..., 0, 1︸︷︷︸
ith
, 0, ..., 0

 where i = argmax
j=0,1,...,n
{bj} .
Proof. Let X (t) =
t∫
0
B (s) ds⇒X ′ (t) = B (t)
By similar calculations, one gets:
X ′ (t) = B (t)
=
√
−
2
3
C1X3 (t) + C2X2 (t)− 2C3X (t) + C4.
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5where
C1 =
n∑
i=1
p0pirRri
(
αA
i
c − α
Ai
d
)
Ai0
,
C2 =
n∑
i=1
piri
(
αA
i
c − α
Ai
d
)
R0 + p0rRα
Ai
c A
i
0
Ai0
,
C3 = R0
n∑
i=1
αA
i
c .
Our optimal problem now becomes :
{
min
P∈P
C1
max
P∈P
C2.
Using notations in (15) and (16), the problem becomes

min
n∑
i=1
aix0xi
min
n∑
i=0
−bixi
s.t.


0 ≤ xi ≤ 1,
n∑
i=0
xi = 1
(17)
Using the scalarization method and for γ ∈ [0, 1], setting
Fγ (x0, x1, . . . , xn) = γ
n∑
i=1
aix0xi − (1− γ)
n∑
i=0
bixi,
we now get the problem:
minFγ (x0, x1, ..., xn)
s.t.


0 ≤ xi ≤ 1 (i = 0, 1, . . . , n),
n∑
i=0
xi = 1.
By considering cases like in Theorem 1 and using similar
arguments, we complete the proof.
Numerical illustrations
In this section, we will present numerical experiments for
three cases of Theorem 1, where the Red force is attacked in
the first, the second and the third stage, respectively.
Experiment 1: The Red force is attacked in the
first stage
In this experiment, we consider a battle between Blue force
and Red force supported by two supply agents A1, A2 with
initial number of troops are
R0 = 120, A
1
0 = 30, A
2
0 = 20, B0 = 160.
The attrition rates of R with A1, A2 and those of B to R and
A1, A2 are given in the following table
Case 1
(αA
1
d , α
A1
c ) (α
A2
d , α
A2
c ) (rR, r1, r2)
(0.15, 0.4) (0.1, 0.3) (0.5, 0.3, 0.2)
We computed the ”threatening rates” by (2) and obtained
b0 = 0.35, b1 = 0.3, b2 = 0.24.
Therefore, the optimal fire allocation for Blue force in the
first stage is P ∗ = (1, 0, 0), i.e, Blue force concentrates its
firepower to the Red force, not its supply agents. Besides
the optimal fire allocation, we also consider two other fire
Time
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
N
um
be
r o
f B
lu
e 
tro
op
s
0
50
100
150 Optimal P*=(1, 0, 0)
P1=(0.7, 0.2, 0.1)
P2={(0, 1, 0) → (1, 0, 0)}
Blue force is 
eliminated
Red force
 is eliminated
Figure 4. Number of Blue troops vs time in Experiment 1
.
allocations P1 = (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) and P2 = {(0, 1, 0)→
(1, 0, 0)}. The allocation P2 should be interpreted as
follows: in the first stage, Blue force focuses its firepower
to fight supply agent A1, after A1 is eliminated, it attacks
the Red force with its full power. The outcome of these
calculations are presented in Figure 4
Experiment 2: The Red force is attacked after
one of its supply agents is excluded
We slightly modify the parameters used in Experiment 1,
thus make
Case 2
(αA
1
d , α
A1
c ) (α
A2
d , α
A2
c ) (rR, r1, r2)
(0.15, 0.4) (0.1, 0.3) (0.5, 0.15, 0.4)
The initial conditions are kept as in Experiment 1 and the
”threatening rates” now are
b0 = 0.35, b1 = 0.15, b2 = 0.48.
According to these rates, the optimal fire allocation for
the first stage is now P ∗ = [0, 0, 1]. When the first stage
finishes at t1 = 0.7536, the troops of the Red force and agent
A1 remain unchanged, while the Blue troops is B(t1) =
106.3. The fully-disconnected attrition rate of R with A2 is
added to the attrition rates ofR withA1 and make these rates
now
(α˜A
1
d , α˜
A1
c ) = (0.25, 0.5).
Threatening rate of Red force is now b˜0 = α˜
A1
c rR = 0.25,
while threatening rate of A1 remains the same as b1 = 0.15.
It follows that the next target of Blue force is the Red force.
After finishing the Red troops, Blue force puts an end to the
battle. Hence, the optimal fire allocation is
P ∗ = {(0, 0, 1)→ (1, 0, 0)}.
To make a comparison, two fire allocations are selected:
P1 = (1, 0, 0) and P2 = (0, 1, 0).
Figure 5 depicts the conclusion of the three choices. Among
three choices of fire allocations, P ∗ and P1 result in victory
for Blue force. The battle ends with the failure of Blue force
with fire allocation P2.
Experiment 3: Blue force attacks two supply
agents of Red force first
In this experiment, we consider equation (1) with
Prepared using sagej.cls
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Time
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
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f B
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e 
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0
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Optimal P*={(0, 0, 1) → (1, 0, 0)}
P1=(1, 0, 0)
P2=(0, 1, 0)
End of stage 1
A2 is eliminated End of BattleR is eliminated
End of battle
B is eliminated
Figure 5. Number of Blue troops vs time in Experiment 2
.
Time
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
N
um
be
r o
f B
lu
e 
tro
op
s
120
140
160
180
200
Optimal P*={(0, 0, 1) → (0, 1, 0) → (1, 0, 0)}
P1=(1, 0, 0)
P2=(0.8, 0.1, 0.1)
End of Battle
Red force is eliminated
A1, A2 remain
End of stage 2
A1 is eliminated
End of stage 1
A2 is excluded
Figure 6. Number of Blue troops vs time in Experiment 3
.
Case 3
(αA
1
d , α
A1
c ) (α
A2
d , α
A2
c ) (rR, r1, r2)
(0.15, 0.4) (0.1, 0.3) (0.5, 0.3, 0.4)
and initial conditions
R0 = 120, A
1
0 = 30, A
2
0 = 20, B0 = 200.
Threatening rates of the Red party are
b0 = 0.35, b1 = 0.3, b2 = 0.48,
and thus, for the first stage, Blue force focuses its firepower
to A2. Once the first stage finishes, the remaining troop of
Blue force is 182. The fully-disconnected attrition rate of R
withA2 is added to the attrition rates ofR withA1 and make
these rates now
(α˜A
1
d , α˜
A1
c ) = (0.25, 0.5).
Threatening rate of Red force is now b˜0 = α˜
A1
c rR = 0.25,
while threatening rate of A1 remains the same as b1 = 0.3.
Therefore, in the second stage, Blue force will concentrate
on fighting agent A2. And for the third stage, Blue force
will conclude this battle with a fight against R with its full
firepower. These three stages are depicted in Figure 6 (the
red curve).
Conclusion
In this work, we have introduced a novel model for battle
with supplies. Computing the ”threatening rates” of the
Red party’s entities, we managed to show the optimal fire
allocation of the Blue party. Generally, at the beginning of
any stage, Blue force will concentrate its firepower to the
entity which possesses the largest threatening rates; at the
end of the stage, threatening rates are recalculated. This
process is repeated until the battle ends. These results have
generalized some known results in this field.
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